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 RELEVANCE AND REASONS IN PLANNING MATTERS
The identification of relevant considerations is fundamental to any decision-
making process, since power must be exercised for the purposes for which it
was conferred.  (1)   Judicial review  imposes a duty on planners to consider
only relevant matters and to ensure irrelevant ones are ignored.  What is
relevant is ultimately a  a matter for the court.   The judicial determination of
relevance can  profoundly alter an administrator's perception of the range of
permissible policy choices falling within the scope of their statutory powers.
(2)      Controversy arises  where judicial values seem to infiltrate the
interpretative process exposing the courts to the charge of making political
choices for administrators. (3)   Unfortunately the indeterminacy of the
relevancy/irrelevancy ground for judicial review does little to remove the sting
of such reproaches.      Leading academic commentators have lamented that
"The range and flexibility of this judicial technique are obvious, and equally
obvious is the difficulty of reducing it to precise rules".  (4)
Recent  planning decisions have attempted to offer an innovative analysis of the
nature and significance of "relevant" considerations.  The new tests have also
been  extended to the duty to give reasons, and each of these matters will be
considered below.  In relation to the relevancy/irrelevancy ground for review
two issues have been conflated.  The first is whether  a matter is legally
relevant.  This is the first task facing an administrator or, indeed, the reviewing
judge.  The second  issue is whether a remedy  should be available by way of
judicial review (5) if the decision is defective.   The problem is that  tests once
used to  determine whether relief should be granted are now  deployed to
determine the logically prior question: what is a relevant consideration?   This
may have the unfortunate consequences discussed below.  In  the context of  the
duty to give reasons, the courts have  drawn freely upon the innovative, and
controversial, relevancy/irrelevancy test   to interpret the extent of the duty to
give reasons.   This  will  restrict the information available to interested parties
in planning  matters.
Identifying Relevant Matters.
In the Wednesbury case, the locus classicus on the grounds for judicial review
Lord Greene MR stated that
2"(The decision maker)  must call his own attention to the matters which he is
bound to consider.  He must exclude from his consideration matters which are
irrelevant to what he has to consider."  (6)
"The court is entitled to investigate the action  of the local authority with a view
to seeing whether they have taken into account matters which they ought not to
have taken into account, or, conversely, have refused to take into account or
neglected to take into account matters they ought to take into account."  (7)
This recognises that decision makers have a duty to consider all relevant
matters.  In planning law this has been accepted as trite law. (8)   The questions
which this duty poses are "what is  relevant"? and "what are the consequences
where  a relevant consideration is ignored?"   These issues will be considered in
turn.
Relevancy
Constitutional principle holds that relevance is a matter to be assessed by
reference to the purposes of the decision-making power and the policy of the
legislation under which the power is conferred.  (9)    This is no more than an
expression of the subordinate relationship of the executive to Parliament, for
the  expressed or presumed intentions of Parliament should always prevail. (10)
Statutes  sometimes identify which matters must be taken into account and
occasionally  even indicate how great an importance is to be attached to those
matters. (11)
There is some authority  that statute may permit the administrator to distinguish
two different kinds of relevant consideration.     This was  suggested in  Ashby
v.  Minister of Immigration (12)  in which Cooke J. observed that there might
be "obligatory considerations", which according to the express and implied
intention of Parliament had to be considered, and "permissible" considerations
to which regard could properly be paid, but which the decision maker was not
obliged to consider. This   distinction was accepted by Glidewell L.J. in the first
Bolton case (13)   where his lordship  cited extensively  from  another
judgment of Cooke J. in CREEDNZ Inc v. Governor General (14)   In that
3judgment Cooke J. stated: "What has to be emphasised is that it is only when
the statute expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required to be taken
into account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the Court holds
a decision invalid....It is not enough that a consideration is one that may
properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many people,
including the Court itself, would have taken into account if they had to make
the decision."  (15)  This  appears to mean that judicial review is only available
where an express or implied statutory obligation to consider the matter arises.
In the absence of such an obligation, the administrator may be permitted to
consider a matter, but review is unavailable if he or she chooses not to do so.
Subsequently, in his own judgment (16) Glidewell L.J. expressly  accepted the
distinction in CREEDNZ Inc., but the principles he subsequently formulated  as
deriving from the general body of precedent do not appear to be so clear. These
principles seem  to reject the notion that judicial review should not be available
where "permissible matters" have been ignored; indeed,  Glidewell L.J. stated
that the significant distinction  would be between matters which the statute
expressly required the administrator to consider and those other matters which
the court identified as relevant from the statutory context. Even in the latter
case  there would be an implied obligation to take account of such matters.   On
the question of invalidity Glidewell L.J. continued that the decision would be
invalid if the matter not considered was "fundamental to the decision" or there
was a real possibility that it would have made a difference to the decision.  It is
thus unclear whether in English law categories of non-binding relevant matters
can be  recognised, unless "permissible" is synonymous with "non-fundamental
and non-influential".   It is suggested, however,  that even this interpretation
would   be contrary to principle. (17)
Courts also have regard to the significance of the matter within the statutory
context: if a matter is judged to be important in that sense it is relevant.   In R v.
Hillingdon ex p Goodwin (18)   Woolf J stated that a factor which was "so
fundamental that it would be quite wrong as a matter of law for the authority
not to have regard to its existence" was a relevant factor.   (19)     As we have
seen, when Glidewell J. formulated a series of principles from the body of
precedent he envisaged that an examination of the possible the "fundamental"
nature of the matter would be an alternative approach to the causation question
in establishing its relevance.  (20)     He also stated: "The relative importance of
4a matter which has not been taken into account, is an aspect, and a very major
aspect, of the question "was that consideration relevant?".   (21)
Further,  the courts undoubtedly have a creative role in determining the limits
of administrative decision-making.  Relevancy/irrelevancy  is a key tool in
designing the architecture of judicial supervision of administrative action.  It is
unrealistic to regard statutory interpretation as the result of objective scientific
investigation, particularly were  unfettered subjective discretion has ostensibly
been conferred.   Moreover,  an administrator's statutory discretion remains
subject to common law rules unless the statutory context  demands otherwise.
The courts enforce their interpretation of enacted words rather than the words
themselves.  As Laski observed the courts can enact into law a particular
system of social philosophy which may be altogether different from that
espoused by administrators.  (22)   This means that relevance can be influenced
by common law values as much as legislative ones, most famously perhaps, the
sanctity of private property  (23) or the value which the common law attaches to
upholding legitimate expectations and promises.  (24)     Accordingly,
intervention (a separate issue from establishing relevance)   may   be more
likely where rights/expectations are at stake.  (25)     This is considered below.
The Consequences of Failing to Consider Relevant Matters
 Recent planning jurisprudence draws upon earlier and complex strands of
authority which hold that failure to consider a relevant matter is not necessarily
fatal to the decision, even if such a failure constitutes an error of law. Judicial
intervention is not de cursu.
At the level of general principle the circumstances in which intervention is
possible remain somewhat ill-defined. Where the material consideration
wrongly omitted is "insignificant" the court is unlikely to grant relief.  (26)
But the court's discretion to refuse relief is not confined merely to cases where
the error is trivial. (27)  
It is important at the remedial stage to examine whether the failure to consider a
relevant matter has had some causative influence on the decision itself.  If the
5decision-maker would have reached the same decision  notwithstanding the
defect the court is unlikely to intervene.  The emphasis upon causative
consequences, which is now well supported by authority,    thus assists the
court in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction to quash a decision
tainted by an error of law.   (28)  This appears , for example, in   the judgment
of Sir John Donoldson MR in the Wellcome Foundation case (29)   where his
lordship observed:  "The Jurisdiction of the court to entertain applications for
judicial review is a supervisory jurisdiction of an essentially practical nature
designed to protect the citizen from breaches by decision makers of their public
law duties.  That there will be such a breach if the decision maker takes account
of relevant matters in the sense that his decision is affected thereby is not in
doubt.  But, if his decision is not affected thereby, there is not good reason why
the jurisdiction of the court should be exercised and every good reason why it
should not."
This causation issue betrays some indecision about the function of judicial
review itself.  It is evident that our constitutional  system  does not see the
purpose of judicial review as the control of administrative action per se: proof
of illegality is by itself insufficient and legality is subordinate to considerations
of good administration and the perceived need to protect individual rights.  If
dominant purpose of the supervisory jurisdiction were the maintenance of the
Rule of Law, or, more prosaically, a quality control mechanism for
administrative decision making, (30) the courts would intervene in cases where
the decision was tainted by any kind of irrelevance.     However, it is significant
that judicial review is  not triggered by illegality  per se; it is only available
where leave is obtained, and remedies remain discretionary.     Yet the
requirement that government observe the law  must be a constitutional priority
which the courts should recognise unless principled reasons exist to justify the
status quo.  However, it is possible that the courts may be more willing to
intervene where individual rights are at issue and, accordingly, may be more
willing to demand a higher standard in planning matters. (31)
 According to well established principles the causation issue is normally used to
refuse a remedy and not to define what is a material consideration. (32)   Apart
from the decisions discussed below, there is no  authority for using the
causation principle to identify  a relevant consideration.  Thus the first Bolton
case and MJT Securities represent a significant departure from established
precedent.  (33)
6Some conclusions might be ventured at this point: (i)   decision-makers have a
duty to respect the express or presumed intention Parliament as identified in the
proper construction of  enacted words. They should inform themselves  of all
considerations which Parliament actually  identified  as  relevant and take them
into account;      (ii)   the importance of  the matter within the statutory context
is evidence of Parliament's intention that it ought to be considered;  (iii)   if the
decision-maker fails to take a relevant matter  into account the court may
intervene to quash the decision if the consideration is not insignificant and
(quaere) if it is of an "obligatory" rather than merely a "permissible" nature;
(iv)      if the decision would have been the same even if the defect were cured
the court can decide that the defect has had no causative effect and may decline
to exercise its jurisdiction;  (v)  the court may be more willing to intervene
where private rights are involved; (vi) it is important to note  at this stage,
however, that   if Parliament intended a matter to be relevant, it does not cease
to be relevant simply because little or no weight is ultimately attached to it.
This is an important matter to which reference will be made below.
Recent Developments
Recent planning jurisprudence has conflated the primary question: what is a
relevant consideration with the subsequent remedial question.  Relevancy itself
is now in part to be determined by reference to the causation principle.
Moreover, whilst it is judicially acknowledged that relevancy/irrelevancy is a
separate question from the duty to give reasons, the latter duty is  now also
interpreted by reference to the new test for identifying material issues.  This, it
will be argued, is illegitimate and likely to somewhat undermine the duty to
give reasons.
The New Approach to Materiality
It has now been decided that a  matter's  relevance partly depends upon its
likely causative effect on the decision.     If  the matter is one which would not
be likely to influence the outcome of the decision it is not a consideration which
is relevant (provided it is not "fundamental"). This approach controversially
identifies  relevant matters in a manner quite distinct from the orthothdox
Wednesbury approach and transposes the causation question from the remedial
7stage to the definition of relevance itself.  The effect of this will be  to
marginalise matters which, according to the construction of the Act, were
relevant and which, according to Wednesbury, ought to have been taken into
account.  This is so because under Wednesbury, a matter which would have
been identified as relevant according to the proper construction of the statute
would not necessarily be so identified under Bolton where it lacked influence
over the decision.  This confuses relevance with the separate issue  which asks
much weight should be attributed to a relevant matter.
This new approach was adopted in the first Bolton case,  Bolton MBC v.
Secretary of State for the Environment and Greater Manchester Waste Disposal
Authority (34)   which is now frequently cited.  Here, the Court of Appeal  held
that the decision maker must take into account a matter which might cause him
to reach a different conclusion to that which he would reach if he did not take it
into account.  By the verb "might" Glidewell L.J.  stated that he meant a real
possibility that the decision maker would reach a different conclusion if he did
take that consideration into account.
If a matter was trivial or of small importance that if it were taken into account
there would be a real possibility that it would make no difference to the
decision, it was not a matter which the decision maker ought to take into
account.   (Italics supplied).
Glidewell L.J. then went on to hold that if the reviewing judge concludes that
the matter was fundamental to the decision or that there was a  real possibility
that consideration of the matter would have made a difference to the decision
the judge is enabled to hold that the decision was not validly made.  But if the
judge is uncertain whether the matter would have had this effect he does not
have the material before him to conclude that the decision was invalid.
If the judge decides that he could hold the decision invalid there remains a
discretion not to grant relief.
The decision in Bolton  raises some interesting questions. These affect both
administrators and the courts.  First, it requires an administrator to determine
the relevance of a matter by asking whether there is a real possibility that it
would affect the outcome of  the decision.  This  appears to  require a deliberate
8decision on the part of the decision maker either to include or to exclude a
matter from account.  It would not be enough simply to ignore or overlook the
matter because  there would not be the necessary assessment that the matter was
(or was not) likely to affect the outcome.  Further, if the decision maker goes on
to make the necessary causative evaluation he is probably to be understood as
taking the matter into account in reaching his decision.  If he decides that it will
not actually influence the  decision, the decision maker is simply deciding to
accord the factor no weight. (35)    In other words, the matter has been
considered, but no importance has been attached to it in the context of that
decision.   Thus the assessment of the likely influence of the matter on the
outcome fulfils the obligation to consider relevant matters. For practical
purposes the Wednesbury  mandate to consider all relevant matters appears
unaltered so far as the decision maker is concerned.
Subject to the above, however, there may be dangers that relevant matters are
rejected (as irrelevant in the Bolton sense) at too early a stage of the decision-
making process.  This is so because the relevancy/irrelevancy assessment  must
occur at a preliminary stage.  An administrator  may exclude from consideration
a matter which at that preliminary stage appears unlikely to be influential.
Under Bolton the matter is then judged to be irrelevant and there is a duty to
ignore it.    However, it may be premature to exclude it since the decision as to
what weight to attach to a matter can only be made when all relevant matters
have been identified and can be considered together.  The approach under
Wednesbury is to be preferred because a matter which at first appears to be
uninfluential nevertheless remains relevant; it is not excluded at this early stage.
If relevant it must be considered when the weight to be attached to relevant
matters is determined. At this stage matters which once appeared unlikely to be
uninfluential  may prove to be otherwise.  To dismiss the matter at the
preliminary stage risks pre-judgment.
Other difficulties affect a reviewing court which is invited to determine the
relevance of a particular consideration. After Bolton the court is required to
make an assessment of the likely effect a  consideration might have had on the
decision.   This involves a hypothesis which the courts - which lack
administrative expertise - might find difficult to undertake. This is so because
the court can only undertake an assessment of the likely impact of a particular
matter if it is prepared also to examine and balance other matters, including
questions of policy.  It seems that the causation issue  runs perilously close to
9asking a court to substitute its views on the weight to be attached to a
consideration, a task which has long been accepted as a matter for the exclusive
determination of the administrator. (36)
It is also difficult to understand how evidential problems can be avoided since
the court's task involves it in hypothetical findings of fact as to what might have
happened had a matter been considered. As Browne-Wilkinson P. (as he then
was) observed in Sillifant v. Powell Dyffryn, (37)    there is a perilous border-
line between drawing fair inferences from fact and pure guess work.
 Further, the reasonableness of the administrator's actions can only be assessed
at the time the decision was made and not in the light of  ex post facto
speculation about what an administrator might have done if he had acted
differently. (38)    For example, lack of consultation was at issue in   R v.
Hillingdon ex p Goodwin. (39)   How in practice could a court assess what
might be the outcome of a consultation exercise which did not actually take
place?
Duty to Give Reasons (40)
The extent of the duty to give reasons in planning matters has also been
influenced by the new reliance on causation in defining materiality.  This, as
will be discussed below, is not without difficulty and may serve to limit the
reasons which have to be given when, paradoxically, Brooke J. (as he then was)
in MJT Securities seemed concerned to  strengthen the duty  as an important
quality control mechanism for administrative decision making. (40)
The duty to take into account relevant considerations is designed to ensure that
administrators have proper reasons for their decisions.  Apart from the value in
open government and administrative candour, the giving of  reasons may instil
confidence in the decision making it more palatable to those affected.  This
reduces the likelihood of appeal.   Having reasons for a decision is, however,
distinct from the duty to communicate those reasons to the  parties affected by
that decision.   The importance of this distinction is judicially acknowledged,
(42)  but it may nevertheless be a matter to which insufficient regard may  have
been paid in  MJT Securities (see further below).   The difficulty is to identify
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the extent of the duty to give reasons and, in particular, to identify the point at
which reasons are so inadequate as to justify judicial intervention..
The duty binding the Secretary of State to give reasons in a decision letter
following a planning appeal is  not distinct from that binding  inspectors where
they determine planning appeals.   A similar duty binds planning authorities
which refuse planning permission. (43)    The following discussion  in the
context of decision-letters   is therefore of general application.
The first question is whether a decision letter must refer to all material
considerations.  This has been resolved in the negative. (44)    Lord Bridge of
Harwich in Save Britain's Heritage v. No. 1 Poultry Ltd (45)  decided that
whilst the Secretary of State had to have regard to all material considerations,
reference need not be made to all of them in the decision letter.     But this only
begs the question: to which material considerations  should reference be made?
The House of Lords  examined  this issue in Save Britain's Heritage v. No. 1
Poultry Ltd and Bolton MDC v. Secretary of State for the Environment  (46)
and resolved it by upholding the "classical" exposition of Megaw J in Re
Poyser and Mills' Arbitration (47) that "proper, adequate reasons should be
given which deal with the "substantial points  that have been raised."    A
similar formulation  states that there is a breach of the duty if reasons given
were so spare and unexpressed as to leave in the mind of the informed reader a
real and substantial doubt as to the reasons for the decision. (48)  In essence,
this means that the appellant must have sufficient information to understand on
what grounds the appeal has been decided. (49)    However the formulation
which Lord Bridge in Save  found "particularly well expressed " (50) was that
offered by Phillips J. in  Hope v. Secretary of State for the  Environment (51)
which stated that  reasons have to be given in sufficient detail to allow the
recipient to know what conclusions the inspector has reached on  the principal
controversial issues.    This test was also approved and applied by Lord Lloyd
of Berwick in the House of Lords  in the second  Bolton case.  (52)
However,  this approach  is open to criticism in so far as it reduces the
possibility of seeking a judicial review on  the relevancy  ground. This is so
because the failure to refer to a material consideration (which did not relate to
one of the principal controversial issues)  could not lead to an  inference  that
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the Secretary of State had omitted to consider that matter. He might have
considered it, but was simply not obliged to refer to it in his letter.   This  could
be seen as qualifying the rule in Padfield  v. Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries (53)    that where an administrator fails to state reasons for a decision
it may suggest that the decision is irrational if all prima facie reasons seem to
point in favour of a particular decision, but the administrator has adopted a
contrary decision without seeking to justify such a course by the giving of
reasons.   It seems  that this inference is not possible since there might be
reasons which are simply unstated in the decision letter.
Moreover, it has been settled that the court cannot interfere where there are
reasons that might have supported the decision  even if no reasons were
actually stated.  Accordingly, in such cases, the court should assume that there
were reasons to justify the decision (54)   The second  Bolton decision has thus
had   a significant and  restrictive effect on  the duty to give reasons.    This may
explain why  Brooke J. was concerned to qualify its effects  in MJT Securities
v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Chelmsford BC.  (55)   The case
for doing so, according to Brooke J., rested essentially on two arguments.
According to the first, the  principles laid down in the second   Bolton case
should be confined to major public inquiries which have  endured for many
months (as was the case in Bolton).  Brooke J.  stated: "the members of the
House of Lords (in the second Bolton case) would be very anxious if anything
they said to alleviate the burden on the Secretary of State and to cut down delay
in relation to very major planning proposals was taken as a green light to
Inspectors to omit references in their reports or decision-letters in much smaller
applications to issues where it was clear, to quote Glidewell L.J. in the first
Bolton case, (56)    that the matter in question was fundamental to the decision
or that there was a real possibility that the consideration of it would have made
a difference to the decision."
This means that the legitimacy of confining the reasons to the "principal
controversial issues"  is confined to decision letters following  major inquiries.
In lesser inquiries (57)   Brooke J. seems to favour Glidewell L.J.'s view in the
Court of Appeal in the second Bolton case that reference to  all material
considerations should be made in the decision letter. (58)   This is no doubt a
laudable attempt to restrain the erosion of the important quality control function
served by the duty to give reasons after the House of Lords' decision in the
second Bolton case.  This means that the statement of reasons  in smaller
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inquiries could embrace  a reference to all material considerations as
understood in the first Bolton  case, whereas in a major inquiry the statement
need only refer to the  "principal controversial issues".
However, in requiring a reference to be made to all material considerations
Brooke J's formulation does rely on the controversial definition of what is  a
material consideration. This definition (which was not applied in the second
Bolton case)   is  Brooke J 's second ground for  limiting Bolton.   The essence
of Brooke J.'s judgment on this issue is that materiality is not exclusively
identified by a process of statutory construction (the orthodox  Wednesbury
approach).  A relevant consideration is to be identified according to the first
Bolton case discussed above. Accordingly it is one which is  "fundamental",  or,
more controversially, one where there is a  real possibility that it  influenced
the decision.   (59)
The limitation that the  decision maker need only refer to  those matters which
had  real influence on the decision   marginalises  some matters which were
relevant under Wednesbury principles.  This would most affect cases   where
the decision maker has had regard to a matter (which was not fundamental) and
actually resolved to give it little or no weight.  Here  there is no duty to refer to
that in the decision letter, because that consideration (by its actual treatment)
ceases to be a relevant consideration. It is neither fundamental nor causatively
significant and so ceases to qualify as relevant.
This may restrict opportunities for appeal or review because the Wednesbury
perversity principle may apply where the decision-maker acts unreasonably in
attaching little or no weight to a relevant matter.  (60)  However, the omission
of a reference to that consideration in the decision letter  would almost certainly
not lead to an inference of perversity.    This is so because Glidewell L.J.'s
formulation, which Brooke J adopted, permits the decision maker to omit
reference to matters which are not "fundamental" as well as those which were
not influential. A court faced with an omission in a decision letter would then
encounter the uncertainty of not knowing which of these alternatives might
furnish the explanation for the omission.  The difficulty would be that a
decision-maker might quite properly  resolve that a matter is non-fundamental
and yet  act perversely in according it no weight.
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Further, the appellant's perception of the importance of a matter may differ
significantly from that of the inspector or the Secretary of State.  An appellant
may have attached great weight in submissions to a matter which ultimately had
little influence on the final decision.  Ex hypothesi no reference need be made
to it in the decision letter.  If this is correct  it  must mean that the parties will
sometimes  lack sufficient information to understand on how matters they
regarded as important in argument  have been resolved.  This may actually
encourage appeals.
Conclusion
It is argued that relevancy should be determined by the traditional Wednesbury
principles. This is dependent on a process of statutory construction   to
determine the purposes for which  power was conferred.  If the administrator
fails to consider a matter which under this approach is judged to be relevant the
decision is tainted by an error of law.  Causation should play no role in
distinguishing relevant from irrelevant matters.
The causation question should only arise (if at all)  at the point where the court
considers whether or not it ought to grant relief.    It may even be preferable to
abandon reliance on causation altogether since it invites the court to make a
hypothetical assessment  which in the absence of clear evidence may be little
more than guesswork.   The judiciary should also be wary of venturing the
hypothesis that an administrator might  have reached the same decision even if
the defect had not occured.
It is tentatively suggested that the court should retain a broad discretion to
refuse relief. One ground upon which this discretion could be exercised would
be where the relevant matter ignored is "insignificant" within the statutory
context,  regardless of its actual causative effect.   This possibility differs from
the causation test since  even matters  which might normally have carried little
weight may be decisive in cases where all relevant considerations, both for and
against a particular proposal, are balanced. This is perhaps a case where the
courts should defer to the administrator's decision and not intervene. (61)
Nevertheless, under the first Bolton tests the matter would seem to invite
review because of the causative effect of that particular consideration.
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The duty to give reasons should be observed to the extent that the recipient
should understand the administrator's decision on the principal arguments
advanced by the parties, and the main grounds on which the decision is
founded.  This is a different approach from that upheld in MJT Securities since
the latter decision does not leave scope in the decision letter (even in small
inquiries) for the important information that little or no weight was attached to
an argument advanced by the parties.  The courts should ensure that tests to
identify relevance are not inappropriately used to interpret the extent of the
statutory duty to give reasons.
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familiar principle that certain questions of central government policy are not
amenable to judicial review: Nottinghamshire CC v. Secretary of State [1986] 1
All E.R. 199.  If this interpretation is correct it raises some doubt as to whether,
in English law,  non-binding relevant considerations can exist outside the realm
of policy decisions  of central government, and so undermines the
permissible/obligatory distinction to that extent.
(16)   (1991) 61 P & CR 343, at  353.
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(20)  See point 6.  (1991) 61 P & CR 343, at 353.
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(22) H J Laski, Studies in Law and Politics (London, 1932).  Roberts v.
Hopwood [1925] AC 578, which was the subject of Laski's remarks, is a  much
cited example   See also Bromley v. GLC  [1982] 1 AC 768.
(23)  Id.
17
(24)  See e.g., for a recent statement R v. Secretary of State for the Environment
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other grounds.
(28)  See  e.g., R v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission ex p Owen  [1985]
QB 1153; R v. Secretary of State for Social Services ex p Wellcome Foundation
Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 1166.
(29)   R v. Secretary of State for Social Services ex p Wellcome Foundation Ltd
[1987] 1 WLR 1166 Steven Brown  and Croom-Johnson L.J.J concurred in the
judgment of Sir John Donoldson MR.
(30)   MJT Securities v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Chelmsford
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(32)   R v. Secretary of State for Social Services ex p Wellcome Foundation
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P & CR 343 discussed below.
(33) Bolton MBC v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Greater
Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (above n.13);   MJT Securities v.
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(34)   (Above n. 13). The leading judgment was delivered by  Glidewell L.J.
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earlier conflicting authority, for example,  West Midlands Co-operative Society
v. Secretary of State  [1988] JPL 121.  In the case of the Secretary of State   the
duty is derived from  rule 17 (1) of the Town and Country Planning (Inquiries
Procedure) Rules 1992   SI 1992 No 2038 which states:  "17.-(1) The Secretary
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